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KANSAS V. HENDRICK:  MUSTN’T OUR SHEPHERDS PROTECT 
EVEN THE WOLVES? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By any measure, Americans are under siege.  In 1996, 95,769 women re-
ported being raped to law enforcement.1 While it is difficult to ascertain with 
any certainty the number of children molested each year in the United States, 
various surveys have determined that between nineteen and thirty-five percent 
of all women experienced some sort of childhood sexual victimization.  Alt-
hough the same statistics indicate that relatively fewer men are the victims of 
childhood sexual assault, the rate of incidence is still significant.2  Because ex-
perts agree that only a small percentage of victims ever report their victimiza-
tion, the actual numbers are assuredly higher than those reported.3  No one can 
reliably determine the percentage of these crimes that are committed by indi-
viduals suffering from some form of mental illness which compels their behav-
ior.4  Regardless of the numbers involved, the anecdotes describing these vio-
lent depraved acts are such that any parent would welcome legislation 
designed to protect their children from those who would prey on them. 
During a twenty-four year career as a sexual predator, Earl Shriner com-
mitted a number of acts of sexual aggression against children.  These attacks 
included several rapes, a number of beatings and a stabbing.  As is common to 
many sexual criminals, Shriner served time on and off in various state prison 
facilities.  Shriner was forced to retire from his chosen field when he was ar-
rested in 1987 for kidnapping a seven year old boy, raping the boy, strangling 
 
 1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 23 (1997).  Reliable national figures are not available for the number of reported 
child sexual victimizations.  This figure includes only reported incidences of “carnal knowledge 
of a female forcibly and against her will.” 
 2. DAVID FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 132 Table 10-1, (1979).  
These statistics may be slightly inflated with regard to the issue of  Kansas’ Sexually Violent 
Predator Act by virtue of the fact that all of the three studies cited included “flashing” as a form 
of victimization.  The Act does not include “flashing” as a sexually violent act for purposes of 
determining whether an individual is a sexually violent predator. 
 3. See ROBERT A. PRENTKY, PH.D., ET AL., CHILD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH 
ISSUES (1997). 
 4. Id. 
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him and then severing the boy’s penis.  Shriner was caught only because the 
boy lived and identified him to police.5 
Westley Dodd molested children over a fifteen year period, beginning 
when he was only a child himself at the age of sixteen.  For various acts of de-
pravity forced on young children, Dodd served only a few months in jail dur-
ing that entire period.  Dodd was finally charged with and convicted of the 
murder of three children, including that of a four year old boy whom Dodd 
first raped and tortured.  Proud of his actions, Dodd professed, prior to his exe-
cution, that if he ever escaped from prison he would “kill and rape again, 
and . . . [would] enjoy every minute of it.”6 
Americans’ outrage at those responsible for the commission of these 
crimes recently found expression in a series of legislative attempts aimed at 
specifically deterring recidivism through indefinite involuntary commitment of 
variously defined Sexually Violent Predators (“SVPs”) to mental institutions 
either in lieu of a prison sentence or upon the SVP’s release from prison.  This 
legislation has sparked an acrimonious debate between those defending the 
rights of the individual offender and those seeking to protect society from what 
has become an epidemic of sex crimes.  The most recent and perhaps most  
portentous of these debates was recently heard before the United States Su-
preme Court in a case styled Kansas v. Hendricks.7 
This Note first examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Hendricks up-
holding a Kansas SVP statute providing for the indefinite commitment upon 
release from prison of “mentally abnormal” dangerous individuals who have 
committed sex crimes.  The Court upheld the SVP statute over Hendrick’s pro-
test that it violates principles of due process, ex post facto, and double jeop-
ardy.8  This Note then posits that the Court missed an opportunity to declare 
that all involuntarily civilly committed individuals enjoy a fundamental right 
to minimal state provided habilitative therapy designed to promote their recov-
ery and eventual release.  Finally, this Note argues that Kansas should not be 
allowed to legislate in contravention of well established constitutional princi-
ples in order to remedy a situation for which it is at least in part responsible. 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  Prior Pertinent Supreme Court Decisions 
The U.S. Supreme Court has often heard challenges to legislation and oth-
er state actions that impose civil commitment on the mentally ill.  Three of 
 
 5. See John Leo, Sexual Predator Laws Should Be Upheld, WIS. ST. JOURNAL, (1996). 
 6. Id. 
 7. 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 2085, 86. 
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these cases are particularly pertinent to the issue at hand: Addington v. Texas,9 
holding that the risk of an erroneous judgment mandating involuntary indefi-
nite civil commitment is such that the state must demonstrate by some standard 
greater than a preponderance of the evidence that an individual is indeed men-
tally ill and likely to be a danger to himself or others;10 Allen v. Illinois,11 
holding that an Illinois SVP statute which has as its primary aim the treatment 
of the SVP is not criminal in nature;12 and Foucha v. Louisiana,13 holding that 
a criminal defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may only be committed to 
a state mental institution until such time as the acquitee can demonstrate his 
sanity irrespective of whether he remains dangerous.14 
a.  Addington v. Texas 
In Addington, the Court considered an appeal of an individual adjudged 
both dangerous and mentally ill by the state of Texas.  Addington, who had 
been repeatedly subjected to involuntary confinement on a temporary basis 
was charged with the crime of “assault by threat” when he threatened to physi-
cally harm his mother. Texas, rather than prosecuting Addington, chose to pur-
sue a petition for involuntary civil commitment filed by Addington’s mother. 15  
At trial, the Court charged the jury that Addington was to be committed only 
in the event that it found Addington both dangerous and mentally ill by “clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence.”16 
Addington challenged the judgment on the grounds that the evidentiary 
standard of “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” violated his due 
process rights and that the Court should have charged the jury to apply a “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” standard in considering whether the state had aptly 
demonstrated that he was both dangerous and mentally ill.17  The Court deter-
mined, after balancing Addington’s interest in remaining free against the 
state’s interest in protecting Addington from himself and protecting others 
from Addington, that application of the Texas standard afforded sufficient pro-
tection to Addington against an erroneous judgment.18 
In determining that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard proffered by 
Addington as necessary to protect his due process rights was not required in a 
civil commitment proceeding, the Court concluded that a “civil commitment 
 
 9. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 10. Id. at  432, 433. 
 11. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 12. Id. at 374. 
 13. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 14. Id. at 80. 
 15. Addington, 441 U.S. at 420. 
 16. Id. at 421. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 427. 
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proceeding can in no sense be equated with a criminal prosecution,”19 the situ-
ation in which the standard is typically employed.20  In supporting this finding, 
the Court cited the Texas Supreme Court’s determination that “the State of 
Texas confines only for the purpose of providing care designed to treat the in-
dividual.” 21 
b.  Allen v. Illinois 
In Allen, the state of Illinois dropped the charge of sexual deviate assault 
filed against Allen for lack of probable cause and then sought to have him de-
clared a “sexually dangerous person” under its Sexually Dangerous Persons 
Act22(“the Illinois Act”).23  After hearing testimony from the psychiatrists who 
had interviewed Allen, the trial court did find Allen to be a sexually dangerous 
person within the meaning of the Illinois Act and ordered him committed to a 
state psychiatric facility until such time as Allen was able to demonstrate that 
he no longer labored under the mental illness driving his predatory behavior.24  
Allen argued that the Order of the court should not be enforced and the judg-
ment labeling him a sexually dangerous person should be overturned because 
it was obtained after presentation of testimony by psychiatrists who formed 
their opinions on the basis of Allen’s own words in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self incrimination.25 
Because the privilege against self incrimination applies primarily in crimi-
nal proceedings,26 the Court in deciding whether Allen’s privilege against self 
incrimination had been violated undertook a determination of whether the pro-
ceeding instituted against Allen was criminal in nature.  The Court first looked 
to Illinois’ characterization of the statute as civil,27 and then considered wheth-
er Allen had provided “‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s purported] inten-
tion that the proceedings be civil.”28  The Court, after considering and dismiss-
ing Allen’s arguments, determined that the Illinois Act was civil in nature pri-
marily because “the State has a statutory obligation to provide ‘care and 
treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recov-
ery’ . . . in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care.” 29  Allen apparently 
 
 19. Id. at 428. 
 20. 17 Am.Jur. 2d Evidence § 168. 
 21. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428, n.4 citing State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 566 (1977). 
 22. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch.38, § 105-1.01 (1985). 
 23. Allen, 478 U.S. at 365-66. 
 24. Id. at 366. 
 25. Id. at 367. 
 26. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). 
 27. Allen, 478 U.S. at 368. 
 28. Id. at 369. 
 29. ILL. REV. STAT., ch.38, § 105-8; Id. 
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challenged only the Illinois Act’s facial constitutionality and adduced no evi-
dence that Illinois’ failed to provide even the minimum level of  care provided 
for in the Illinois Act. 
c. Foucha v. Louisiana 
In Foucha, the appellant was committed to a state psychiatric facility after 
being found not guilty by reason of insanity of committing an aggravated bur-
glary and illegally discharging a firearm.  Four years after his commitment, the 
superintendent of the facility recommended Foucha’s release based on a de-
termination that Foucha was no longer suffering from a recognized mental ill-
ness.  Following this recommendation, a “sanity panel” concurred with the su-
perintendent’s determination that Foucha was no longer mentally ill, but would 
not contend that Foucha was no longer dangerous based on several incidents 
which had occurred during Foucha’s commitment and a determination that 
Foucha had an “antisocial personality”, a condition not identified as a mental 
illness.30  Because Louisiana law required that an involuntarily committed in-
dividual carry the burden not only of proving that he or she is no longer in-
sane, but also no longer dangerous before obtaining release, the Louisiana 
Court of Appeals overseeing Foucha’s request for release denied the request 
and the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld that denial.31 
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Louisiana Supreme Court reason-
ing that i) keeping an individual confined to a psychiatric institution is a viola-
tion of due process unless a determination is made in a civil commitment pro-
ceeding that the individual is both dangerous and mentally ill,32 ii) because 
Foucha, although dangerous, was no longer mentally ill he was entitled to a 
hearing that complied with all of the procedural safeguards mandated by  the 
Fourteenth Amendment and such safeguards were absent from his release 
hearing,33 and iii) concepts of substantive due process are offended by the con-
tinued civil  incarceration of an individual who is not both mentally ill and 
dangerous irrespective of the procedures employed.34  Louisiana, the Court 
held, regardless of its interest in protecting the public could not confine an in-
dividual against his or her will as a mentally ill dangerous person regardless of 
whether the act which led to a determination of mental illness was criminal in 
nature. 
B. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act 
 
 30. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 72-5. 
 31. Id. at 75. 
 32. Id. at 77. 
 33. Id. at 79. 
 34. Id. at 80. 
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In 1994, the state of Kansas passed the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator 
Act (“the Act”) which provides for the involuntary civil commitment of indi-
viduals who suffer from either a “mental abnormality” or “personality disor-
der” which renders them likely to engage in sexually violent acts.35  The Kan-
sas legislature’s purported motivation in passing the Act is expressed in the 
Act’s preamble which explains that: 
[a] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist 
who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for 
involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary commitment stat-
ute] . . . sexually violent predators generally have anti-social personality fea-
tures which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and 
those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.  The 
legislature further finds that sexually violent predators likelihood of engaging 
in repeat acts of predatory violence is high.36 
The Act defines a SVP as: 
any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent of-
fense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which 
makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.37 
The legislature defined “mental abnormality” as: 
a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capaci-
ty which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a de-
gree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.38 
The Act affords a number of procedures designed to ensure that only those 
individuals who fall within its definitional purview are incapacitated as SVPs.  
Those procedures include an evaluation by mental health professionals,39 a re-
quirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is 
a SVP40 and various procedures by which an incapacitated individual may ob-
tain review of his or her status as a SVP in order to win release.41  In the event 
 
 35. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2076. 
 36. KAN.STAT.ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). 
 37. Id. at  § 59-29a02(a) (1994). 
 38. Id. at § 59-29a02(b) (1994).  § 59-29a02(e)(1)-(10) of the Act defines sexually violent 
offenses to include rape, indecent liberties with a child, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, 
criminal sodomy, aggravated criminal sodomy, indecent solicitation of a child, aggravated inde-
cent solicitation of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, aggravated sexual battery, or “any con-
viction for a felony offense in effect at any time prior to the effective date of this act, that is com-
parable to a sexually violent offense” as defined in the Act. 
 39. Id. at § 59-29a05 (1994). 
 40. Id. at § 59-29a07 (1994). 
 41. Id. at § 59-29a08, 10, 11 (1994); This provision of the Act provides for, inter alia, annual 
mental evaluations of the SVP by a professional retained by the SVP, an annual review of the 
SVP’s progress by the court, annual notice to the SVP of his right to petition for release, and  the 
right of the SVP to have an attorney present at the annual review. 
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that an institutionalized SVP is unable to win release under any of these proce-
dures, his or her commitment would continue indefinitely.42 
While there is little question that the drafters of the Act intended the Act 
primarily to protect the public from the threat posed by SVPs,43 the Act, never-
theless, expressly  established a “civil commitment procedure for the long-term 
care and treatment of the sexually violent predator.”44 
C. Leroy Hendrick’s Criminal History 
Leroy Hendrick’s staunchest legal allies would concede that he is a dan-
gerous man.  Now 61 years old, Hendrick’s criminal history began when he 
plead guilty to indecent exposure after displaying his genitals to two young 
girls in 1956.  In 1959, he was again convicted of a sexual offense for playing 
strip poker with a minor.  In 1960, Hendricks was sentenced to three years im-
prisonment for molesting two young boys.  Almost immediately upon release 
from prison, Hendricks was again arrested, this time for molesting a seven year 
old girl.  He was released from prison in 1965 and only two years later, Hen-
dricks was convicted for the molestation of a young boy and girl.  It was dur-
ing  this period of imprisonment that Hendricks was diagnosed as a pedophile 
and was provided with what proved to be ineffective treatment.45  
The passing years did little to curb Hendricks sexual appetite for children.  
He was convicted once more in 1984 for engaging in sexual acts with two thir-
teen year old boys (one of whom was afflicted with cerebral palsy) and it is 
upon completion of this sentence that the state invoked the Act in an attempt to 
specifically deter Hendricks from the commission of violent sexual acts 
through his incapacitation.46 
Hendricks, during his commitment hearing, stated that he cannot control 
his impulses to molest children and that the treatment that the state provided in 
the past had been ineffective in suppressing his desires and would not be any 
more effective in the future and is in fact “bullshit.”47 
 
 42. Id. at § 59-29a08. 
 43. KAN.STAT.ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996) 
(holding that “[i]t is clear that the overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the segrega-
tion of sexually violent offenders from the public); Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2083-2084. 
 44. KAN.STAT.ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)(emphasis added). 
 45. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 143. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that Kansas may institutionalize Hen-
dricks until his psychological rehabilitation is effected, Hendricks’ eyes have apparently been 
opened to the virtues of Kansas’ treatment regimen.  In an interview first broadcast on January 
11, 1998 on CBS’ 60 minutes, Hendricks stated that he lacked interest in rehabilitation earlier 
because “it meant spilling [his] guts, letting somebody else know about [him], and [he] didn’t like 
that.”  His forty years of preying on the public has, he claims, now come to an end because he 
“want[s] to stop the molesting, [he] want[s] to stop the hurting. [He] want[s] to heal [him]self.”  
Treatment, he believes, will give him this opportunity.  If Ed Bradley could only have “known 
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D. Procedural History 
Immediately prior to the expiration of his last prison sentence, the State of 
Kansas properly employed the procedures mandated by the Act in seeking 
Hendrick’s civil commitment.48  Hendricks requested, as was his right under 
the Act, a jury trial to determine his status as a SVP.49  Based upon Hendrick’s 
pedophilic history, his own testimony, the testimony of his evaluating psychia-
trist and the testimony of various experts, the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Hendricks was a SVP as defined by the Act and was therefore sub-
ject to indefinite commitment.50 Leroy Hendricks was the first person civilly 
committed under the Act.51 
Hendricks appealed this decision to the Kansas Supreme Court claiming 
that the Act violated the substantive due process component of the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause as well as the Con-
stitutional principles of ex post facto and double jeopardy.52  The Kansas Su-
preme Court struck down the Act holding that it did not conform to the dic-
tates of an earlier U.S. Supreme Court case, Foucha v. Louisiana.53  Foucha 
held that an individual’s fundamental right to remain free from involuntary 
civil commitment could only be abridged by the states upon a showing that the 
individual was both dangerous and mentally ill.54  Because the Act requires 
only a finding that an individual suffers from a mental abnormality and not a 
mental illness, the Kansas Supreme Court found the Act facially unconstitu-
tional and overturned Hendrick’s commitment.  Having invalidated the Act on 
substantive due process grounds, the Kansas Supreme Court reached no deci-
sion regarding Hendrick’s ex post facto or double jeopardy arguments.55 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiori filed by the State of 
Kansas appealing the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court as well as Hen-
drick’s cross-petition.56  It is this appeal which the U.S. Supreme Court decid-
ed in Kansas v. Hendricks. 57 
 
[him] then and known [him] now.”  Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this near miraculous 
transformation was caused by the State of Kansas’ treatment program or the shock treatment of a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision condemning Hendricks to a possible life behind bars. 
 48. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2079. 
 49. Id. 
 50. In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 253 (1996). 
 51. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2085. 
 52. In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. at 253. 
 53. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 54. Id. at 74  (citation omitted). 
 55. Hendricks, 259 Kan. at 261. 
 56. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2076. 
 57. Id. 
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III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
A.  The Plurality 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiori to decide whether the Act vio-
lates principles of substantive due process, equal protection, and ex post fac-
to.58  The opinion of the Court, drafted by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist as well as Justices O’Connor and Scalia overturned the Kan-
sas supreme court holding that the rule set forth in Foucha for determining 
whether a civil commitment procedure violates an individual’s substantive due 
process right to remain free from incarceration was misapplied.59  The Court’s 
decision, however, focused little attention on Hendrick’s substantive due pro-
cess argument and emphasized a determination that the proceedings envi-
sioned in the Act are civil in nature.60 This determination necessitated the 
Court’s rejection of Hendrick’s Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy arguments 
because those Constitutional provisions apply only in the criminal context.61 
a. The Plurality’s Substantive Due Process Analysis 
The Court denied Hendrick’s substantive due process claim almost sum-
marily by declaring that while Foucha does dictate that the state may override 
an individual’s fundamental right to be free from restraint upon a showing of 
both dangerousness and “mental illness”, the term “mental illness” was not in-
tended by the Court to “require State legislatures to adopt any particular no-
menclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.  Rather [the Court has] tradi-
tionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that 
have legal significance.”62 
The Court explained that while an individual’s potential for dangerousness 
alone  is not sufficient to justify commitment, the additional requirement of  
some sort of  mental disorder (whether such disorder be termed an “abnormali-
ty”, “illness” or “personality disorder”) is intended to “limit involuntary civil 
confinement to those who suffer from volitional impairment rendering them 
dangerous beyond their control.”63  The plurality found Hendrick’s lack of vo-
litional control supported by both his diagnosis as a “pedophile” and Hen-
 
 58. Id. at 2079. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2081-6. 
 61. Id. at 2081. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2080 (emphasis added).  It is ironic that Justice Thomas, viewed almost exclusive-
ly as a judicial conservative, would state that pedophiles lack the willpower to resist raping chil-
dren in light of the fact that this same statement implies that the pedophile acts almost involuntary 
and is therefore devoid of the necessary mental intent to sustain a criminal conviction.  Also, as 
discussed infra note 78, the American Psychiatric Association does not recognize the astonishing 
lack of volitional control posited by Justice Thomas as symptomatic of pedophilia. 
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drick’s own admission that “when he becomes ‘stressed out’ he cannot ‘con-
trol the urge’ to molest children.”64  Accordingly, the Court determined that 
Hendrick’s was both dangerous and suffering from precisely the sort of mental 
disorder contemplated in Foucha and that Hendrick’s fundamental right to re-
main free from restraint was therefore subject to abridgment by the Kansas 
legislature.65 
b. The Plurality’s Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Analysis 
The Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution66 has been held to pro-
hibit the imposition of any additional penalty for a crime already punished.67 
The protection against double jeopardy found in the bill of rights68 has been 
interpreted to prohibit not only subsequent prosecutions for the same offense, 
but also the imposition of second criminal punishments for the same offense.69  
While Justice Thomas acknowledged the potential applicability of both claus-
es, he also stated that a finding that the challenged state action is criminal in 
nature is a prerequisite to application of either clause.70  The Court concluded 
that the commitment proceeding described in the Act was civil in nature.71 
The Court’s determination that the Act contemplates a civil commitment 
proceeding rather than a criminal proceeding is predicated on a finding that the 
Kansas legislature intended the Act to create a civil proceeding72 and that 
Hendricks did not produce the “clearest proof” that the Act is sufficiently pu-
nitive to negate the Kansas’ legislature’s purported intent.73  The Court relied 
on the Kansas legislature’s inclusion of the Act in the Kansas probate code ra-
ther than the Kansas criminal code as well as the Act’s language that provides 
 
 64. Id. at 2081 (citation omitted); Would Justice Thomas so readily accept Hendrick’s own 
testimony as to Hendrick’s inability to control his sexual urges were Hendrick’s to offer such tes-
timony as a defense in a criminal proceeding?  Consider this question in light of the fact that the 
Court denied certiori in a case in which a trial court refused to instruct a jury on the irresistible 
impulse insanity defense where the only evidence of the defendant’s insanity was a statement 
made by the defendant that he could not control his urge to kill and rape. State v. Gilbert, 671 
P.2d 640, cert. denied (U.S.) 104 S.Ct. 1429. 
 65. Id. 
 66. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. 
 67. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)(finding an Ex Post Facto violation in 
the application of a state mandatory sentence law to  the sentencing of a convict whose crime was 
committed while the sentence length was still a matter of judicial discretion). 
 68. U.S. Const. Amendment V. 
 69. Witte v. United Sttaes, 515 U.S. 389, 391 (1995)(stating that “the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits . . . multiple punish-
ments for ‘the same offence’”). 
 70. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2085. 
 71. Id. at 2086. 
 72. Id. at 2082 
 73. Id. 
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for a “civil commitment procedure” in assessing the legislature’s intent.74  The 
determination that the Act is not sufficiently punitive to negate that intent 
mandated a more complicated analysis. 
Justice Thomas first argued that evidence of the Act’s non-punitive nature 
can be found in the fact that it is neither retributive nor intended to deter, two 
of the classical objectives of criminal sanctions.75 Civil commitment is intend-
ed not to punish the SVP for prior acts, rather prior acts of sexual violence are 
considered by the state as evidence of dangerousness.  In addition, the condi-
tions under which the SVP is confined do not differ from those experienced by 
any other civilly committed individual.  Consequently, a finding that the Act’s 
civil commitment scheme is punitive would dictate a finding that all civilly 
committed individuals are being punished by the state.  Justice Thomas reject-
ed this argument concluding that the Court has historically recognized that in-
carceration of the dangerously mentally ill is a legitimate non-punitive gov-
ernmental objective.76  In short, the Court held that when the objective of the 
state is to confine dangerous mentally ill individuals for the express purpose of 
protecting the public, such action necessarily does not have as its purpose the 
punishment of those individuals.  This view is bolstered, the Court concluded, 
by the Act’s provision for indefinite incapacitation indicating the legislature’s 
concern that SVPs remain incarcerated only until such time as they are no 
longer mentally ill and no longer pose a threat to society.  In contrast, a defi-
nite period of commitment would evidence an intent to confine an individual 
in retribution for prior criminal activity.77 
As to the issue of deterrent effect, the Court found that because SVPs, by 
definition, suffer from a disorder which precludes the exercise of reasoned self 
control, their diminished volitional capacity renders them unable to resist the 
temptation to offend regardless of the potential consequences. Because invol-
untary actions cannot be deterred, it would have been irrational for the Kansas 
legislature to intend involuntary civil commitment to serve as a deterrent.  Jus-
tice Thomas refused to ascribe to the legislature such an unfulfillable intent. 78 
The Court then considered and rejected Hendrick’s claim that the paucity 
of treatment provided by Kansas is in and of itself sufficient evidence of the 
Act’s punitive nature. Rather, Justice Thomas argued, the lack of treatment is 
 
 74. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2082. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2083. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2082.  Interestingly, the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of 
Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”), published by the American Psychiatric Association, does not in-
dicate that compulsion or lack of volitional control is necessarily symptomatic of pedophilia.  In 
fact, the DSM-IV relates that the recidivism rate of pedophiles is only between thirteen and eight-
een percent.  A disorder characterized by a lack of volitional control would likely have a signifi-
cantly higher rate of recidivism. 
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evidence only of the fact that the mental disorder from which Hendricks suf-
fers is untreatable79 or that in the alternative, the Court has never mandated 
that lack of treatment renders a civil commitment statute criminal when the 
overriding concern of such a statute is segregation of dangerously mentally ill 
individuals from the public.80 
Having found the Act civil in nature, the Court held that under no circum-
stances could the Act be found to violate either principles of double jeopardy 
or ex post facto given the requisite predicate finding of each doctrine that the 
suspect state action is criminal in nature. 
B.  The Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy’s brief concurrence is entirely in accord with the findings 
of the plurality and is drafted only to express his concern that while the Act is 
not punitive in nature,  the Court’s decision should not be read to sanction 
state legislation which only purports to impose civil penalties but in actuality 
serves retributive or deterrent ends.  Kennedy argues that at all costs the civil 
and criminal processes should remain distinct.81 
C.  The Dissent 
The dissenting opinion, drafted by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg concurred with the plurality’s disposition of 
Hendrick’s substantive due process argument (albeit employing unique reason-
ing), but took issue with the Court’s determination that the Act is not punitive 
in nature.  Finding the Act punitive, the dissent necessarily reasoned that the 
Act violates both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Justice Breyer agreed with the plurality that nothing in federal substantive 
due process jurisprudence prevents the indefinite incarceration of dangerous 
individuals who suffer from a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder.  He 
agreed that while Foucha may have relied upon the term “mental illness”, the 
states retain a great deal of discretion in determining just what sorts of mental 
problems in conjunction with dangerousness render an individual amenable to 
involuntary civil commitment. The exact terminology employed to describe 
the mental problem, be it illness, abnormality or any other similar verbiage, is 
inconsequential, assuming that the mental problem from which the prospective 
civil committee suffers is the sort encompassed by Foucha.  He also agreed 
that, regardless of its categorization,  Hendrick’s mental problem is exactly the 
sort anticipated by Foucha. 82 
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 80. Id. at 2084. 
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Specifically, Justice Breyer found the American Psychiatric Association’s 
recognition of pedophilia as a mental disorder,83 combined with the testimony 
that Hendrick’s pedophilia results in a “highly unusual inability to control his 
actions”84 sufficiently compelling to warrant the conclusion that regardless of 
the terminology employed by the Kansas legislature in drafting the Act, the 
Act’s application to Hendrick’s case fulfills Foucha’s mandate. 85 
Finally, Justice Breyer admitted that  Hendrick’s case raised the question 
of whether, as a matter of substantive due process, the state must provide 
available treatment to an involuntarily committed mentally ill individual, but 
declined to answer that question, stating that the “same question is at the heart 
of [his] discussion of whether Hendrick’s confinement violates the Constitu-
tion’s Ex Post Facto clause.”86 
The dissent, while conceding that an initial inquiry into the criminal or 
civil nature of state legislation must necessarily rely on the label attached to 
the legislation, argued that Hendricks was able by the “clearest proof” to estab-
lish that the Act is indeed criminal in nature despite its classification by Kan-
sas.87  Justice Breyer reasoned that because in Allen v. Illinois88 the Court 
stressed the fact that Allen would receive treatment for his condition in finding 
the Illinois Act civil in nature, any civil commitment statute which postpones 
treatment of SVPs until their prison terms expire “begins to look punitive.”89 
The dissenting Justices reasoned that this lack of treatment during criminal 
incarceration combined with the Act’s categorization of treatment of the SVP 
as a tertiary rather than “primary objective” is sufficient evidence of the Kan-
sas legislature’s actual intention that the Act serve a punitive function.  Justice 
Breyer identified additional evidence for this view in both the fact that, regard-
less of the Act’s facial commitment to treatment, Hendricks was not initially 
provided with treatment after his commitment under the Act90 and the fact that 
the Kansas supreme court itself determined that treatment was “‘at best’ an 
‘incidental’ objective” of the Act.”91 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2089; see also discussion supra note 78. 
 85. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2089. 
 86. Id. at 2090.  As will be made clear in Section IV of this Note, the issue of whether an 
involuntarily committed individual is entitled to minimal habilitation designed to promote his or 
her eventual cure and release is not at the heart of a determination of whether Kansas’ failure to 
provide treatment to Leroy Hendricks violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 478 U.S. 364 (1986)(upholding the authority of the states to involuntarily commit dan-
gerous mentally ill individuals who had not been convicted of a crime). 
 89. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2092. 
 90. Id. at 2094-95. 
 91. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2097. 
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Finally, Justice Breyer argued that it is incumbent upon the states to em-
ploy less restrictive measures than civil commitment (assuming that such 
measures exist) in order to avoid a finding that a civil commitment statute is 
punitive in nature.  Justice Breyer attempted to demonstrate the existence of 
such less restrictive measures through a survey of seventeen other states’ simi-
lar laws, all of which either provide for treatment of SVPs during their crimi-
nal incarceration, mandate a consideration of less restrictive measures, or ap-
ply only prospectively in contrast to the Act. 
Justice Breyer found that the Act, regardless of its classification by Kansas 
as civil, is punitive and therefore criminal in nature and necessarily violative of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The Dissent ultimately opined that states may enact 
SVP statutes, providing that such statutes act only prospectively and meet the 
treatment requirements detailed previously. 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
A.  Freedom from Restraint as a Fundamental Right 
While a great deal of scholarly comment can and surely will address the 
complex and controversial issues so thoughtfully considered by both the plu-
rality and dissent in Hendricks, one of the issues which the Court failed to ad-
dress is equally noteworthy.  The  Court virtually ignored the issue of whether 
Leroy Hendricks enjoys a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to sufficient state provided 
habilitation to promote his recovery and eventual consequent release.   
The principal issue on which the plurality and dissent disagree is primarily 
one of factual interpretation.  Both agree that the legal test for whether state 
legislation is criminal or civil first requires consideration of the state’s charac-
terization of the Act and that a party challenging that characterization must 
demonstrate by “ the clearest proof”92 that the state is either being disingenu-
ous in its civil characterization or that, regardless of the state’s actual motiva-
tion, the legislation is so punitive as to render it criminal in nature.  The plural-
ity determined that Hendricks had proffered insufficient evidence to meet this 
very strict standard.  The dissent concluded that the Act’s failure to provide for 
treatment during a SVP’s criminal incarceration combined with the state’s 
failure to provide Hendricks with meaningful treatment during his civil com-
mitment was sufficient evidence of Kansas’ ulterior motivation and the Act’s 
punitive character.  Any analysis of this aspect of the decision, while fascinat-
ing in its own right, ignores the more fundamental issue which neither the plu-
rality nor the dissent adequately considered.  Given that individuals do enjoy a 
fundamental right to remain free from incarceration (a right which may only be 
 
 92. Id. at 2082. 
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abridged by the states upon demonstration of a compelling interest in effecting 
such incarceration), do civilly confined individuals also enjoy a fundamental 
right to rehabilitative services designed to promote the individual’s release? 
Sufficient precedent exists to mandate an affirmative response to this con-
stitutional query.  The Supreme Court, in deciding the case of Youngerg v. 
Romeo93 held that Youngberg, a profoundly mentally retarded man committed 
to a state psychiatric institution, enjoyed the fundamental right to “minimally 
adequate habilitation.” Specifically, the Court stated that: “as [the Court had] 
recognized that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in . . . free-
dom from restraint . . . training may be necessary to avoid unconstitutional in-
fringement of those rights.”94 
Admittedly, this holding related to the more circumscribed concern of 
whether Youngberg required habilitation in order to promote his freedom from 
shackling and not to the more expansive concern at issue in Hendricks of  
freedom from restraint by incarceration.  It is, however, not difficult, in light of 
both the Court’s language in Youngberg and the policy motivations which 
drove the decision to postulate an expansion of the holding that includes the 
fundamental right that Hendricks should have asserted. 
The Court, in Youngberg, endorsed Youngberg’s assertion that he was en-
titled to at least minimal treatment to reduce his aggressive tendencies.  Such 
training, Youngberg asserted, was essential if he was to remain free from the 
shackling imposed upon him by the institutional personnel charged with his 
care to control his aggressive behavior.95  Likewise, Hendrick’s civil commit-
ment is premised on Kansas’ compelling interest in protecting children against 
Hendrick’s “uncontrollable” pedophilic tendencies.  At least with regard to the 
fact that both of these cases involve an imposition on the freedom of two indi-
viduals based entirely on those individuals’ inability to control violent impuls-
es, both cases are analogous. 
Even Justice Thomas has written that: 
an incarceration of persons is the most common and one of the most feared in-
struments of state oppression and state indifference, we ought to acknowledge 
at the outset that freedom from restraint is essential to the basic definition of 
liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.96 
Given Justice Thomas’ identification of incarceration with restraint, would 
it be possible for Justice Thomas to deny that Hendrick’s fundamental right to 
habilitation can and should be a natural extrapolation of the principles laid 
down by the Court in Youngberg?  Like Youngerg, Hendricks, as a result of 
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 94. Id. at 318. 
 95. Id. 
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uncontrollable aggressive tendencies (as determined by Justice Thomas)97 has 
been incarcerated by the state and thereby subject to restraint.  As was the case 
with Youngberg, it is conceded that there is at least the possibility that a mini-
mal amount of habilitative therapy could alleviate Hendrick’s aggressive, and 
in his case pedophilic, tendencies.98 The Youngberg decision rested on the 
principal that because individuals enjoy a fundamental right to remain free 
from restraint, the state, if it abrogates that right in order to protect a compel-
ling interest, must provide the minimal tools necessary for the individual to 
overcome this imposition. 99  In essence, both Hendricks and Youngberg were 
deprived of well recognized liberty interests relating to their physical liberty. 
There is little language in Youngberg which might be construed so as to 
limit the holding’s expansion to Hendricks.  The majority in Youngberg assert-
ed that: 
the State is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appro-
priate professional would consider reasonable to ensure [the respondent’s] 
safety and to facilitate [the respondent’s] ability to function free from bodily 
restraints.  It may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training 
could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of vio-
lence.100 
Is not incarceration the most intrusive form of bodily restraint imaginable?  
Does not an incarcerated person lose far less when he is subject to restraint by 
shackling than a free person loses when incarcerated?  The incarcerated indi-
vidual who is shackled loses only the ability to move freely within his prison.  
By contrast, a free person, as a result of incarceration, loses his autonomy, an 
essential element of liberty.  Once incarcerated, a formerly free individual is 
under the complete and total control of the state.  Incarcerating a free person 
 
 97. See supra note 33 at 4. 
 98. The debate over whether there is any treatment which might benefit pedophiles was cer-
tainly not settled in the pages of this opinion, however, a survey of the most recent studies con-
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agreement that some sexually violent predators are amenable to treatment.  See J.K. Marques, et 
al., Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment on Sex Offender Recidivism, 21 CRIM. JUST. & 
REFORM 28 (1994); W.L. Marshall & W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome 
with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 10 (1994); Keith Hawton, Behavioral Approaches 
to the Management of Sexual Deviations, 143 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 248 (1983); Robert J. 
Mcgrath, Sex Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition Planning:  A Review of Empirical and 
Clinical Findings, 34 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 323 (1991); W.L. 
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of Adolescent Sexual Offenders, 34 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 105 
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Sex Offenders, 37 SOC. PROBS. 375 (1990). 
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is, therefore, a far greater imposition on individual liberty than is the shackling 
of an already incarcerated person.  Accordingly, the fundamental right to re-
main free from restraint in the form of incarceration should be afforded greater 
protection than the right to remain free from restraint in the form of shackling 
imposed upon an already incarcerated individual.  This right, if it is to be given 
anything more than lip service, can best be protected by a declaration that in-
voluntarily civilly committed individuals are fundamentally entitled to the 
minimal habilitative therapy necessary to alleviate the mental illness which has 
rendered them subject to restraint by incarceration. 
Certainly, critics of this argument will contend that its acceptance would 
impose upon the states an obligation to provide habilitation to those incarcer-
ated as a result of their conviction for the commission of a crime and that it 
would also perhaps mandate that the goal of that treatment be release upon 
completion of the treatment regimen.  This criticism would be made in error.  
As the Court noted in Youngberg, while it had “established that [the respond-
ent] retains liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily restraint . . . 
these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in conflict.”101  
Simply because state action violates an individual’s fundamental rights under 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, does not necessarily render that state ac-
tion unconstitutional.  The Court, in determining whether the state’s violation 
of an individual’s fundamental right is valid, inquires into whether the state 
has a compelling interest in abridging that fundamental right and whether there 
are less restrictive means which the state could employ in furtherance of that 
compelling interest.102 
In Youngberg’s case, the state could not have demonstrated a compelling 
interest in denying him minimal habilitation designed to promote his freedom 
from restraint.  In fact, if anything, habilitative therapy was in the interest of 
the state in that it might have prevented.  Youngberg from assaulting either the 
attendants or the other patients, all of whom were owed a duty by the state.103  
In the case of a prisoner convicted of a criminal offense, the state does have a 
compelling interest in refusing to provide treatment or habilitation aimed at 
freeing the prisoner from the restraint of incarceration.  Namely, the  state can 
cite one of the primary purposes of criminal sanctions, general deterrence.  No 
 
 101. Id. at 319, 320.  Youngberg, 357 U.S. at 319-320. 
 102. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that an individual’s 
fundamental right to privacy in marriage may not be abridged by the state in order to further a 
less than compelling interest in preventing teen pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)(upholding a woman’s fundamental right to privacy as against the less than compelling 
right of the state to protect the fetus within the first two trimesters of pregnancy and to protect the 
mother within the first trimester); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(finding a fun-
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in preventing overcrowding). 
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such similar interest exists in the case of involuntary civil commitment be-
cause “[those] persons committed under the Act are, by definition, suffering 
form a ‘mental abnormality’ . . . that prevents them from exercising adequate 
control over their behavior.  Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred 
by the threat of confinement.”104 
B.  Why the Court Did Not Consider the Right to Minimal Habilitation in its 
Due Process Analysis. 
It is not difficult to understand why the plurality failed to identify minimal 
habilitation as a fundamental right enjoyed by the involuntarily civilly commit-
ted.  In Foucha, the very decision on which both the Hendricks plurality and 
dissent relied as an articulation of the test for determining the constitutionality 
of involuntary civil commitment procedures, Justice Thomas, in dissent, sup-
ported the continued civil commitment of a then sane insanity acquittee with-
out requiring a showing that the individual was both dangerous and mentally 
ill.105  Justice Thomas’ decision rested primarily on his finding that “there is a 
real and legitimate distinction between insanity acquittees and civil commit-
tees that justifies procedural disparities.”106  The State, he argued, has a con-
tinuing interest in incarcerating those who avoided conviction based solely on 
a finding that they did not possess the mental faculties necessary to form mens 
rea.107  If Justice Thomas was willing to find that the continued civil commit-
ment of a person who has regained his sanity did not violate any fundamental 
right possessed by that individual, it is not particularly surprising to find Jus-
tice Thomas unwilling to postulate a new fundamental right which might result 
in the eventual remediation and consequent liberation of another civilly com-
mitted individual. 
The question of why the dissent failed to identify the fundamental right of 
minimal habilitation is, while equally understandable, slightly more complicat-
ed. The dissent admitted that “[t]he basic substantive due process treatment 
question is whether that Clause requires Kansas to provide treatment that it 
concedes is potentially available to a person whom it concedes is treatable.”  
The dissent went on, however, to forestall a determination of this issue stating 
that  “[t]his same question is at the heart of [its] discussion of whether Hen-
dricks’ confinement violates the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.”108  It is 
impossible, given the demonstrated legal acumen of dissenting Justices Breyer, 
Stevens and Souter, to believe that they really consider an exploration of 
whether Hendricks enjoyed a fundamental right to treatment the same as a dis-
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cussion of whether lack of treatment is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
a state civil commitment statute is sufficiently punitive so as to render the stat-
ute criminal in nature.  The former inquiry is one of sweeping magnitude 
which would force all states that have enacted involuntary civil commitment 
legislation to provide for the treatment of their involuntarily committed popu-
lations.  An affirmative finding in the latter inquiry would mandate only that 
states must offer treatment if they wish to avoid a finding that legislation 
which provides for the involuntary civil commitment of dangerously mentally 
ill individuals upon the expiration of their prison terms violates the U.S. Con-
stitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. 
The dissent also probably feared that their embrace of a heretofore unes-
tablished fundamental right would expose them to unnecessary criticism. Sub-
stantive due process analysis in general and the recognition of a new funda-
mental right in particular are arguments of last resort in light of the concerns 
which have been expressed over the past six decades that invalidation on sub-
stantive due process grounds is an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of 
the several states.109  If the dissent’s goal was to strike down the Act, it was far 
safer to avoid the stigma still associated with substantive due process analysis 
and to focus on the alleged Ex Post Facto violation. 110 
Finally, the remedy available to the dissent in the event that it recognized a 
fundamental right to minimal habilitation would not have mandated the invali-
dation of the Act.  A finding that Hendricks enjoys a fundamental right to min-
imal habilitation would have resulted in the invalidation of the Act as violating 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only in the event that the Act 
failed to provide for that minimal habilitation. The Act, however, does purport 
to establish “a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treat-
ment of the sexually violent predator.”111  The Act, as it reads, would therefore 
be constitutional.  The only question that would remain is whether the Act as 
applied violates Hendricks’ rights.  The plurality concedes that the “treatment 
program initially offered Hendricks may have seemed somewhat meager.”112  
The dissent implicitly endorses the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court that 
“as of the time of Hendricks’ commitment, the State had not funded treatment, 
it had not entered into treatment contracts, and it had little, if any qualified 
treatment staff.”113  Certainly, the manner in which the Kansas Act applied 
would violate an individual’s right to minimal habilitation were that right to be 
established. 
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Because the Act, on its face, does not offend the substantive component of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause, the Court could not have 
struck down the statute to remedy an unconstitutional application.  Rather, the 
Court could only demand that Kansas apply the Act as written and provide 
Hendricks with the minimal habilitation to which he was entitled.  Not only 
would this remedy not comport with the Court’s ultimate finding that the Act 
is unconstitutional as a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause, but because Kan-
sas did eventually provide treatment to Hendricks no continuing violation and 
therefore no remedy would have been available to Hendricks.114 
A resort to a substantive due process argument was undesirable to the dis-
sent because, were it accepted, it would have extremely broad application to 
all civil commitment statutes and it would expose the dissent to the criticism 
normally associated with the Supreme Court’s articulation of a new fundamen-
tal right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause.  These reser-
vations, coupled with the fact that a finding of a fundamental right to minimal 
habilitation would afford absolutely no relief to Hendricks, ensured that the 
dissent would advance no such argument. 
C.  Kansas Cannot Offend the Constitution to Correct its Own Mistakes 
The public needs protection from SVPs.  The statistics and anecdotes pro-
vided in the introduction to this Note provide ample support for this proposi-
tion.  It is, however, evident that the rape of adults and the molestation of chil-
dren is not a particularly new phenomenon.115  It is only recently that these 
crimes have come to the forefront of public awareness and only more recently 
that the punishments meted out to sexual offenders have come to be commen-
surate with the injuries these predators inflict on both their victims and socie-
ty.116  Because the legislatures are understandably influenced by this powerful 
trend in public opinion, they seek both to sate the public appetite for security 
and retribution and to somehow make amends for the almost indifferent legis-
lative approach taken in the past.  Statutes like the Act which provide both for 
commitment of those who commit new sex crimes as well as the commitment 
of  SVPs who have already completed prison terms are legislation aimed at ac-
complishing both of these objectives. 
While this sort of legislation was upheld in Hendricks, the position of the 
dissent should be afforded great consideration.  It is difficult to deliberate on 
 
 114. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2085, n. 5 (citing the determination by the Kansas trial court that 
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the Act and at some visceral level not conclude that the Act’s objective with 
regard to those who have already served their prison sentence is not an attempt 
by the state to take a proverbial second bite at the apple.  The dissent, while it 
should also have determined that Hendricks enjoyed a right to minimal habili-
tation, was correct in its assertion that the lack of treatment afforded Hendricks 
after such treatment was declared to be a goal (albeit a tertiary goal) belies the 
assertion of the legislature that the Act is civil in nature.  If the Act is not puni-
tive and if, as has been conceded by the plurality, asserted by the dissent, and 
advanced by the majority of experts in the field117 many if not most SVPs are 
amenable to treatment, why did Kansas not comply with the Act and treat 
Leroy Hendricks’ pedophilia?  The only reasonable answer to this query is that 
the actual aim of the Act is to continue to punish those who have already 
served the sentence that Kansas previously and in retrospect improvidently 
deemed appropriate as punishment  for an act of sexual violence. 
If the principles embodied in the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy 
clauses118 are to be given any real effect, the Kansas legislature, as well as the 
legislatures of the several states, ought to admit that the threat Hendricks and 
others like him pose to society is at least partially their doing.  Hendricks was 
convicted on seven separate occasions over twenty-nine years of committing 
sex crimes against children.119  Of those crimes, five involved some sort of 
sexual assault.  In 1960, Hendricks was arrested for the molestation of “two 
young boys while he worked for a carnival.” Hendricks served only two years 
in a state prison for that crime.  In 1967, Hendricks was convicted of “[per-
forming] oral sex on [an] 8 year old girl and fondl[ing an] 11 year old boy.”  
He served less than five years in prison for those offenses.  Almost immediate-
ly upon his release in 1972, Hendricks forced his step-children to engage in 
various depraved acts.120  Why was Hendricks free in 1984 to commit the 
crimes which led to his incarceration immediately prior to the proceedings at 
issue in the case? 
Short of the imposition of the death penalty, there is no proportionality re-
quirement implicit in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohi-
bition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”121  Even though this interpreta-
 
 117. See supra note 99, at p.14. 
 118. 16A Am.Jur. 2d,  Constitutional Law, § 635.  The criminal law is to be enforced only 
when individuals are given fair warning that the conduct in which they are engaging is criminal.  
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time of commission. 
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tion of the Eighth Amendment was not made rendered until 1991, as early as 
1980 the Court had decided that while the proportionality requirement of the 
Eighth Amendment does apply to non-capital punishments, it did not preclude 
the states from passing legislation mandating life imprisonment for chronic re-
cidivists.122  In fact, the only apposite modern U.S. Supreme Court decision 
overturning a state sentence as violative of the Eighth Amendment occurred in 
1983 when the Court ruled that life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole imposed upon an individual for the commission of only non-violent fel-
onies was unconstitutional.123 
Consequently, there was nothing during Hendricks entire criminal career 
that prevented the Kansas legislature from enacting legislation that mandated 
at the very least longer sentences for his crimes and at the most the forfeiture 
of his life.  By 1980, there was a Supreme Court decision which permitted 
Kansas to impose a life sentence on Hendricks, who had by that time commit-
ted six felonious sexual assaults on children.  Even absent the 1980 decision, 
there was no contrary authority that prevented Kansas from at least attempting 
to impose a life sentence on SVPs  and then later defending that legislation’s 
constitutionality in the federal courts, much as they did in the case at hand.  
Simply stated, Kansas seeks now to legislatively correct a mistake made con-
tinuously over the last half century, a mistake that time and again loosed Hen-
dricks on the people of Kansas.  While there is no doubt that the public is de-
serving of protection from the likes of Leroy Hendricks, that protection cannot 
come at the expense of the U.S. Constitution.  Leroy Hendricks should have 
been sentenced to life in prison or death in an electric chair long ago. 
V. CONCLUSION: 
It is beyond dispute that Leroy Hendricks is a dangerous man.  He de-
serves to be segregated from the public and the public deserves to be protected 
from his violent depraved behavior.  Toward this end, we should all be pleased 
and grateful for Justice Thomas’ plurality opinion.  This holding, however, ig-
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to speak on the constitutionality of such statutes, both 
Mississippi and Louisiana provide for the imposition of the death penalty for child rape.  Missis-
sippi, in 1995, amended MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 to include the possibility of capital punish-
ment for any person over the age of eighteen who engages in sexual intercourse with a child un-
der the age of fourteen.  Louisiana, in the same year, amended LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 14:42 such 
that capital punishment might be imposed on any individual who commits “aggravated rape” 
against a child under the age of twelve. 
 122. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265-266 (1980)(finding constitutional the application 
of a Texas mandatory life in prison recidivist statute to the case of a third felony conviction when 
the perpetrator’s three felony convictions consisted of “fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain 
$80 worth of goods or services, . . . passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36 [and] . . . ob-
taining $120.75 by false pretenses.”) 
 123. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
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nores previously established constitutional principles laid down in cases like 
Addington v. Texas,124 Allen v. Illinois125 and Foucha v. Louisiana.126  These 
cases required, as the dissent contended, a finding that the Act violates the 
U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy clauses.  Equally, the 
holding in Hendricks  recklessly ignores the possibility that Hendricks, as an 
involuntary civil committee, is entitled to minimal treatment designed to effect 
his cure and eventual release. 
The Plurality has allowed the State of Kansas to violate the principles of 
the United States Constitution in order that Kansas might correct a mistake 
that it has consistently repeated in each legislative session prior to the enact-
ment of the Act.  Kansas never in the past chose, as was well within its power, 
to penalize child sexual molestation sufficiently that sexually violent predators 
would be specifically deterred from recidivism through incarceration.  If there 
was concern in the Kansas legislature that long term imprisonment was too 
great a penalty for a single act of sexual violence towards a child (an assertion 
which I believe would be wholly insupportable), there has never been anything 
preventing Kansas from adopting a statute punishing recidivist child molesters 
with greater penalties upon conviction for a second or third offense. 
The children of Kansas deserve protection, and while the Act might pro-
vide them some measure of protection from SVPs, any time government is 
hastily allowed to abrogate rights granted citizens under the U.S. Constitution 
for the sake of public safety, a very dangerous precedent is set.127  If  Kansas is 
allowed to continue the incarceration of offenders upon expiration of their 
prison terms merely by classifying the behavior which resulted in the imposi-
tion of a prison sentence as “mentally disturbed,” there is very little preventing 
the Kansas legislature from declaring any eccentric behavior a sign of “mental 
abnormality.”  The children of Kansas may be somewhat safer from the likes 
of Leroy Hendricks, but are they now more vulnerable to the intrusions of their 
representatives in the Kansas legislature? 
JON A. BIERMAN 
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